

Public Service Commission of Wisconsin  
Direct Testimony of Christopher W. Larson  
Gas and Energy Division

Wisconsin Energy Corporation  
Docket 9400-YO-100

January 14, 2015

1 Q. Please state your name, business address, and occupation.

2 A. My name is Christopher W. Larson. My business address is Public Service Commission  
3 of Wisconsin (Commission), 610 N. Whitney Way, P.O. Box 7854, Madison, Wisconsin  
4 53707-7854. I am employed as a Public Utility Auditor – Principal in the Gas and  
5 Energy Division.

6 Q. Would you please state your educational background and summarize your duties with the  
7 Commission?

8 A. I am a 1983 graduate of the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse with a Bachelor of  
9 Science degree with a major in accounting. I have been employed with the Commission  
10 since 1984. During my employment with the Commission, I have worked on a variety of  
11 rate cases and other projects involving telecommunications, electric, natural gas, water,  
12 and sewer utilities.

13 Q. Please explain the purpose of your testimony.

14 A. My testimony will focus on options for ensuring that customers of Wisconsin Electric  
15 Power Company (WEPCO),<sup>1</sup> Wisconsin Gas (WG), and Wisconsin Public Service  
16 Corporation (WPSC) (collectively, Wisconsin Operating Companies) share in the  
17 financial benefits of synergy savings. I will also comment on ratepayer protection  
18 associated with push-down accounting.

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<sup>1</sup> In addition to its electric operations, the customers of WEPCO include those of the WEPCO gas operations (WEGO), its Valley Steam (VA Steam) operation, and its Milwaukee County Steam (MC Steam) operation.

1   **SYNERGY SAVINGS**

2   Q.     What comments do you have regarding synergy savings?

3   A.     There are various options for ensuring that ratepayers of the Wisconsin Operating  
4           Companies receive benefits of synergy savings. Absent the conditions I identify, there is  
5           no guarantee that the savings will accrue to ratepayers of the Wisconsin Operating  
6           Companies in the first year after the acquisition. As testified to by Commission staff  
7           witness Lois Hubert, the Commission is obliged to determine that the acquisition is in the  
8           best interest of the utility consumers, investors, and the public. The conditions that I  
9           identify may help enable the Commission to determine that the merger meets the best  
10          interest of ratepayers.

11  Q.     What conditions have commissions of other states imposed on acquisitions and mergers  
12          to ensure that ratepayers receive the benefits of synergy savings?

13  A.     As detailed in Commission staff witness Kevin O'Donnell's testimony, the conditions  
14          imposed by other commissions to ensure that ratepayers receive the benefit of some or all  
15          synergy savings include:

- 16           •     Bill credits – ratepayers receive a set amount or percentage applied as a  
17                  credit on their bills at the time of or shortly after acquisition or merger  
18                  consummation.
- 19           •     Social credits – such as additional money spent on energy conservation or  
20                  renewables.
- 21           •     Write offs – a portion of deferred costs or net investment rate base is  
22                  eliminated from the utility's books of account.
- 23           •     Rate freeze – rates are frozen for a specified period.

24  Q.     What amount of first year synergy savings have customers received in the form of bill  
25          credits or social credits as a result of merger/acquisition conditions imposed by other  
26          commissions?

1 A. As described in Mr. O'Donnell's testimony, the average of such credits in other states is  
2 equivalent to 2 to 4 percent of non-fuel operation and maintenance (O&M) expense.

3 Mr. O'Donnell also testifies as to the amount that this would represent for each of the  
4 Wisconsin Operating Companies.

5 Q. What is the best way to ensure that ratepayers receive benefits of the acquisition during  
6 the first year?

7 A. My answer varies for each company or relevant service type. For WG, WEGO, VA  
8 Steam, and MC Steam, I believe that bill credits are the most appropriate method to  
9 ensure that customers receive the benefits of some or all synergy savings. I believe that  
10 as a condition of Commission approval of the acquisition, the Commission could  
11 consider requiring WG, WEGO, VA Steam, and MC Steam to provide bill credits to all  
12 ratepayers either at the time of or shortly after merger consummation. The Commission  
13 has already set rates for 2015 as well as 2016 for these companies in docket 5-UR-107.  
14 Absent such a condition, customers of these companies would not see any benefit from  
15 the acquisition until at least 2017.

16 Q. If the Commission were to require bill credits for these companies, how would you  
17 suggest that they be implemented?

18 A. As noted in testimony of Commission staff witness Jodee Bartels, it is likely that synergy  
19 savings will be realized in the areas of regulated and corporate staffing, corporate and  
20 administrative programs, information technology, supply change, gas supply, fuel  
21 procurement, generation dispatch, and system control. It would stand to reason that a bill  
22 credit should approximate the way in which synergy savings would affect these cost  
23 areas, and correspondingly, how those savings would flow to individual customers

1 through the cost-of-service study (COSS) and cost allocation process used in base rate  
2 cases. Using 2015 test-year COSS and rate information filed by utility witnesses Robert  
3 Jacobson, Eric Rogers, and William Korducki in docket 5-UR-107, I calculated  
4 per-customer bill credits at both the 2 percent and 4 percent credit levels discussed above.  
5 The calculation of these credits can be found in Ex.-PSC-Larson-2. First year bill credits  
6 could be implemented either through a one-time credit or through monthly credits over  
7 12 billing periods.

8 Q. What condition might be more appropriate to ensure that customers of WEPCO receive  
9 the benefits of some or all synergy savings?

10 A. For WEPCO, bill credits are not the best method, due to its existing balances of deferred  
11 costs. The Commission could consider requiring WEPCO, as a condition of Commission  
12 approval of the acquisition, to write off part or all of its deferred costs. Like WG and  
13 WEGO, WEPCO's rates have been set through the end of 2016. Unlike those companies,  
14 however, as explained in direct testimony of Commission staff witness Mary Kettle,  
15 WEPCO has a very large balance of deferred costs that has built up over a number of  
16 years. As of the end of 2016, WEPCO will have a total deferral balance of slightly over a  
17 half a billion dollars, broken down as follows:

18 **Table 1: WEPCO Deferred Cost Balances Projected at 12/31/16 (\$ Millions)**

	Earning weighted cost of capital	Earning short term debt rate	Total
Deferred transmission costs	\$114	\$239	\$353
Other deferred costs	87	63	150
Total	\$ 201	\$ 302	\$503

19 Q. Mr. O'Donnell's testimony shows that a range of first year ratepayer credits of 2 to  
20 4 percent of WEPCO's non-fuel O&M equals \$24.8 to \$49.7 million. Are there any

1 reasons that the Commission might want to require WEPCO to write off a higher amount  
2 of regulatory assets than that?

3 A. Yes, a write-off of regulatory assets in excess of \$49.7 million, as discussed further by  
4 Ms. Kettle, may be justified for the following reasons:

- 5 • Mr. O'Donnell's calculation of the 2 to 4 percent first year ratepayer  
6 credits required by other state commissions excludes operating expense  
7 write-offs and rate base write-offs that are similar to the write-off of  
8 deferred costs I identified. If those other states' write-offs were included  
9 in Mr. O'Donnell's calculation, the range of first year ratepayer credits  
10 would be higher than 2 to 4 percent.
- 11 • As explained in Ms. Kettle's testimony, WEPCO's earned return on equity  
12 (ROE) has exceeded its authorized ROE over the period that the deferrals  
13 have been building up.
- 14 • Mr. O'Donnell's testimony shows that WEPCO's authorized ROE  
15 exceeds the national average.

16 Q. What condition may be more appropriate to ensure that customers of WPSC receive the  
17 benefits of some or all synergy savings?

18 A. For WPSC, bill credits are not the best method because its most recent rate case only set  
19 rates through 2015. First year synergy savings could be passed on to WPSC customers  
20 through a limited rate case reopener for both the electric and gas utilities the 2016 test  
21 year. The filing of this reopener could be a condition of the acquisition. I propose that  
22 the items to be included in such a limited reopener be limited to:

- 23 • ReACT;
- 24 • Monitored fuel costs;
- 25 • System Support Resources (SSR) payments;
- 26 • Major power plant outage expenses; and
- 27 • Synergy savings.

28 Q. Why do you propose that ReACT costs be reflected in a 2016 test-year limited reopener?

29 A. The ReACT project is extremely large. In docket 6690-CE-197, the Commission  
30 authorized WPSC to construct, install, and place in operation a new multi-pollutant

1 control technology known as ReACT™ at Weston Unit 3. This project is estimated to go  
2 into service in April 2016, at an estimated cost of \$345 million. Using WPSC's weighted  
3 cost of capital and composite depreciation rate, a rough estimate of the 2016 revenue  
4 requirement impact of this project is \$35 million.<sup>2</sup> This represents an impact of  
5 approximately 3.5 percent for this project alone, clearly a substantial impact.

6 Q. Why do you propose that monitored fuel costs be reflected in a 2016 test year limited  
7 reopener?

8 A. Wisconsin Admin. Code ch. PSC 116 requires that monitored fuel costs be updated each  
9 year.

10 Q. Why do you propose that SSR costs be reflected in a 2016 test-year limited reopener?

11 A. The SSR payments are potentially large and hard to predict at this point. SSR costs result  
12 when a generation resource owner (GRO) wishes to retire a generating unit because the  
13 cost to operate the unit is not economic relative to alternative energy sources available to  
14 the GRO, but for which MISO determines that the unit must be maintained to ensure  
15 network reliability. MISO requires the generating unit to remain in service and the GRO  
16 is compensated for keeping the unit in service. An SSR agreement formalizes the amount  
17 of compensation to be received by the GRO and establishes an appropriate allocation of  
18 the compensation to the load serving entities that benefit from the operation of the SSR  
19 unit. WPSC's share of such costs is dependent on upcoming Federal Energy Regulatory  
20 Commission decisions on complaints regarding the level and allocation of these costs.

21 Q. Why do you propose that major power plant outage expenses be reflected in a 2016  
22 test-year limited reopener?

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<sup>2</sup> \$345 million times 10.95 percent economic cost of capital and 2.72 percent composite depreciation expense, for nine-twelfths of the year.

1 A. WPSC performed major planned power plant maintenance during 2015. However, in  
2 2016, no similar major maintenance is planned. Preliminary information indicates that  
3 this will cause a decrease in revenue requirement of approximately \$8 million from 2015  
4 to 2016.

5 Q. Why do you propose that synergy savings be reflected in a 2016 test-year limited  
6 reopener?

7 A. Synergy savings should be reflected to ensure that ratepayers share in the financial  
8 benefits of the acquisition and to ensure that the acquisition is in the best interests of  
9 WPSC ratepayers. An amount consistent with Mr. O'Donnell's testimony would serve to  
10 offset part of the rate increase (or enlarge the rate decrease) associated with the other  
11 three items.

12 Q. Why do you propose that no other items be included in the limited reopener?

13 A. While there will doubtless be many items that would increase or decrease WPSC's 2016  
14 revenue requirement as compared to the revenue requirement authorized by the  
15 Commission for the 2015 test year, I believe that such items may largely offset each  
16 other.

17 Q. Do you have any empirical evidence on which to base your assertion?

18 A. Yes. I have analyzed WPSC's authorized revenue requirement for the period of  
19 2011-2015 by starting with the overall rate increase or decrease authorized by the  
20 Commission, and removing items related to monitored fuel. Monitored fuel related items  
21 include the increase or decrease in monitored fuel costs and any fuel refunds or  
22 surcharges included in the rate increase or decrease.

23 Q. What is the result of your analysis?

1 A. As shown in Ex.-PSC-Larson-1, if items related to monitored fuel are excluded, WPSC's  
2 rates would have been adjusted downward by an average of \$4.4 million (0.4 percent) for  
3 electric operations, and downward by \$3.2 million (0.9 percent) for natural gas operations.  
4 The decreases have been fairly consistent as well. Decreases have occurred for four out of  
5 the five years for electric, and four out of five years for natural gas.

6 Q. Why did you remove amounts related to monitored fuel from this analysis?

7 A. I removed amounts related to monitored fuel because Wis. Admin. Code ch. PSC 116  
8 requires that monitored fuel costs be updated each year. WPSC will recover its 2016  
9 monitored fuel costs based on those rules. The relevant question is what other costs to  
10 include or exclude from a reopener.

11 Q. Do you know of any items that are likely to materially increase or decrease WPSC's  
12 revenue requirement in 2016?

13 A. I know of the following items:<sup>3</sup>

- 14 • Decrease of \$5.7 million due to savings associated with the Integrys  
15 Customer Experience project;<sup>4</sup>
- 16 • Increase of \$6 million associated with another year's capital expenditures  
17 for the System Modernization Reliability Project.<sup>5</sup>

18 Since these items approximately cancel each other out, and are starting to get in the dollar  
19 range where there may be numerous items of similar magnitude whose inclusion in a  
20 reopener would defeat the purpose of limiting the scope of review for a reopener, I do not  
21 recommend including them in a reopener.

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<sup>3</sup> While transmission costs may or may not be another item that increases substantially in 2016, the Commission has authorized escrow treatment for these costs.

<sup>4</sup> See tab A-2 of attachment to WPSC's response to data request 28-CWL-1 in docket 6690-UR-123, PSC REF#: 215592.

<sup>5</sup> This is a rough estimate based on \$222 million of approved total project cost in docket 6690-CE-198, divided by five years, times 10.95 percent economic cost of capital and 2.72 percent composite depreciation rate.



1 Q. Are there other reasons that you recommend that a reopener for WPSC be limited to the  
2 items you suggest?

3 A. Yes. If too many items are included in the reopener, questions will likely arise as to how  
4 the acquisition might affect each of the items, and an accurate answer may not be known  
5 in time to be reflected in revenue requirement.

6 Q. If the Commission chooses to adopt bill credits, write-downs of regulatory assets, and  
7 reopener credits as a condition of the acquisition, what effect might this have on  
8 Wisconsin Energy Corporation's (WEC) commitments regarding employees?

9 A. I believe there will be little if any impact on WEC's commitments regarding employees  
10 for the following reasons:

- 11 • WEC's commitment applies to union employees only, not management.
- 12 • WEC's commitment excludes employee reductions due to attrition.

13 Q. Do you have any comments about potentially imposing a rate freeze on all or some of the  
14 services of the Wisconsin Operating Companies?

15 A. While the concept of a multi-year rate freeze has some appeal in keeping rates stable and  
16 avoiding the issue of whether to allow recovery of transition costs as discussed more fully  
17 by Mr. O'Donnell, there are downsides to this approach.

18 First of all, the revenue requirement may actually decrease during some or all of  
19 the years during the freeze period due to synergy savings exceeding the transition costs,  
20 or decreases in costs not related to the acquisition. In past mergers, the Commission has  
21 authorized rate freezes of four and five years. Since Commission staff does not have  
22 enough information to accurately project four or five years of revenue requirement for the  
23 Wisconsin Operating Companies, it would be difficult to predict if a rate freeze is in the  
24 best interest of the customers.

Secondly, the Commission's experience with rate freezes is that ratepayers bear more risk from rate freezes than appearances suggest. If utilities experience substantial and unanticipated cost increases during the freeze, they are likely to ask for such costs to either be reflected in a limited reopener or deferred until the end of the freeze period. Meanwhile, decreases in costs may escape scrutiny and not be reflected in rate decreases.

Q. What deferrals and rate increases did the Commission grant to Wisconsin Power & Light Company (WPL) during its 1997-2001 "rate freeze"?

A. The Commission's Order approving the merger of WPL Holdings and Interstate Power Co. and IES Industries<sup>6</sup> required that rates be frozen for four years. During the rate freeze, WP&L was granted approval for the following cost deferrals:

**Table 2: WP&L Deferrals Granting During Rate Freeze Period**

Docket	Order date	Description
5-CE-151	3/21/97	Kewaunee steam generation
6680-UR-110	4/29/97	D&D refund and gain on sale of South Fond du Lac
6680-UR-110	5/27/98	Y2K costs
5-ER-101	7/7/98	Kewaunee steam gen
5-CE-108	4/2/99	NOx
6680-EI-104	1/11/00	Rockgen
5-EI-121	2/25/00	ATC startup
5-EI-124	12/22/00	ATC startup
6680-EI-109	12/26/01	Security and insurance costs due to 9/11

In addition, WP&L was allowed to increase rates during the "freeze" period by \$3.3 million in 1998, and \$5 million in 1999.

Q. What deferrals and rate increases did the Commission grant to WEPCO during its 2000-2005 "rate restriction" period?

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<sup>6</sup> Final Decision in docket 6680- UM-100, issued November 5, 1997.

A. A five-year rate freeze for WEPCO was authorized in Docket Nos. 9401-YO-100/9402-YO-101 dated March 15, 2000, when it acquired WICOR. During the rate restriction period, WEPCO was granted approval to defer the following costs:

**Table 3: WEPCO Deferrals Granting During Rate Freeze Period**

Docket	Order date	Description
5-EI-121	2/25/00	ATC startup
5-EI-124	12/22/00	ATC startup
6680-EI-109	12/26/01	Security and insurance costs due to 9/11
6630-GF-107	4/10/03	Port Washington precertification costs
6630-GF-108	5/22/03	Presque Isle
6630-GF-111	4/19/04	PTF precertification costs

In addition, WEPCO was allowed to increase rates during the rate restriction period by 2.5 and 3.35 percent in 2004, and 3.1 percent in 2005.

Q. What were WEPCO's earnings during the period of the rate freeze?

A. As shown in Exhibit-PSCW-Kettle-1, WEPCO's actual regulatory ROE varied between 11.92 and 13.13 percent per year for the 2001 to 2005 period. Over that same period, WEPCO earned approximately \$44 million in excess of its authorized ROE, despite requesting and receiving approval to defer various costs on six separate occasions.

Q. If the Commission believes that a rate freeze is appropriate, do you have any general comments?

A. Due to the numerous deferrals and rate increases that have occurred during past rate freezes, I do not believe a rate freeze is appropriate. If the Commission were to go ahead with a rate freeze, however, I suggest that, for any new deferrals during the rate freeze period, recovery of such deferred amounts should only be allowed to the extent the utility is earning less than its authorized ROE. The actual earned ROE could be measured on a regulatory basis, which means that revenues and expenses that the Commission typically excludes from rate recovery would similarly be excluded from the ROE calculation. In

1           this manner, the Wisconsin Operating Companies would not be able to increase spending  
2           on items such as incentive pay to adjust the level of earnings so that they can defer costs.

3    Q.     You have discussed possible conditions to ensure that customers receive the benefit of  
4           some or all of the anticipated first year synergy savings. What about synergy savings in  
5           subsequent years?

6    A.     I propose for the Commission's consideration that each of the Wisconsin Operating  
7           Companies be required to file a full rate case some time in 2016, for the 2017 test year. I  
8           believe that WEC should be able at that time have a reasonable estimate of both synergy  
9           savings as well as the costs to achieve such savings. Commission staff could then fully  
10          audit such estimates.

#### 11   **ACCOUNTING ISSUES**

12   Q.     What is push-down accounting?

13   A.     Push-down accounting refers to "pushing down" the acquirer's accounting and reporting  
14          basis (which is recognized in conjunction with its accounting for a business combination)  
15          to the acquired entity's stand-alone financial statements. After WEPCO's acquisition of  
16          WICOR, push-down accounting became an issue that staff investigated in WG's next rate  
17          case, docket 5-UR-102. Since that time, WG has annually reported the purchase  
18          accounting amounts associated with push-down accounting and such amounts are  
19          manually removed as part of Commission staff's rate case review.

20   Q.     What is the most recent accounting guidance regarding push-down accounting?

21   A.     In November 2014, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued  
22          Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2014-17. This standard makes the application of  
23          push-down accounting optional. As a result of this new information, WEC has stated that

1 it plans to keep the financial statements of the acquired regulated subsidiaries at historical  
2 cost.<sup>7</sup>

3 Q. Do you propose a condition regarding push-down accounting?

4 A. Yes. I believe that the Commission should require the following condition:

5 Push-down accounting related to the Reorganization shall not be imposed  
6 upon or utilized by the Wisconsin Operating Companies for any purpose,  
7 including for financial and regulatory accounting, and ratemaking.

8 This will help ensure that the acquisition will not affect the capital structure of the  
9 Wisconsin Operating Companies as relevant to revenue requirements and ratemaking  
10 generally.

11 Q. Does that conclude your prefiled direct testimony?

12 A. Yes, it does.

13 CWL:jlt:DL: 00952270

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<sup>7</sup> WEC's response to data request PSCW-20.01, PSC REF#: 226506. See also WEC's response to data request PSCW-01.39, PSC REF#: 219110.